company had milked the acquired firm of technology, trade secrets, customers or liquidity during the interim. 4 In either case, restoration of the acquired firm as a viable competitor was impossible; the identities of the merging firms had become inextricably tangled. With Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 5 Congress intended to cut this Gordian knot before it was tied by facilitating the procedural aspects of preliminary injunctive relief in antimerger cases. 6 The standards governing preliminary relief against alleged antitrust violations are currently in a state of flux, as the federal courts have moved toward liberalization of the traditional standards controlling this type of equitable relief. Aware of the complexities involved in antitrust litigation, the courts of equity have generally sought to maintain the status quo until final decision on the merits.' Although the courts have traditionally refused to issue preliminary injunctions without a showing that the government is likely to succeed at trial and that the balance of hardships favors the government,' both these standards have been and are still being relaxed in antitrust cases. 9 Further, the two standards, often held to be distinct and applied sequentially, are increasingly being melded, with the strength of the showing on one test affecting the showing required on the other. 10 The purposes of this Comment are first, to show that the courts are moving away from traditional standards for preliminary injunctions in antitrust cases, with an identifiable trend toward an automatic approach in merger cases; and second, to discuss the influence of the new report-and-wait requirements in the courts and to examine the possible effects of the statute on the uncertain state of the law. The stakes are high in antimerger litigation: granting preliminary relief may lead to abandonment of the merger;" denying such relief may cause the plaintiff to drop the suit. 12 The dollar values involved are often astronomical, and the potential impact of the new legislation is considerable.
I. A BROADENING OF EQUITY'S TRADITIONS
Courts have traditionaly been cautious in granting a remedy as drastic as the preliminary injunction. 13 Under the traditional formula the plaintiff bears a heavy burden, as he must convince the court that
(1) there is a significant threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; (2) the plaintiff will probably succeed on the merits; (3) the balance between the irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on the defendant weighs in favor of the plaintiff; and (4) the public interest favors granting the injunction. In Clayton Act suits brought by the government, the first requirement is ordinarily eliminated on the assumption that Congress, in authorizing the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission to seek preliminary injunctions, has determined that irreparable injury to the public will always result from the proscribed anticompetitive conduct.' 5 By similar reasoning, the third and fourth requirements are fused into one in government suits: the test is one of balancing the public interest in preventing anticompetitive behavior against the public and private DUKE LAW JOUPNAL [Vol. 1979:249 injury likely to result from the injunction.' 6 In weighing the equities, the courts must also consider the adequacy of less drastic remedies.' 7 In sum, the test that the government must satisfy is twofold: it must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits at full hearing and that the balance of the equities is in its favor.
Over the past decade, the circuit courts have frequently departed from these traditional standards in antitrust cases, and current trends have generated some confusion as to the applicable standards. Perhaps in response to the critical commentary of those who favor an automatic approach, ' 8 some courts have diluted the showing required of the government. The balancing test, developed primarily in the Second Circuit, sets an alternative standard for plaintiffs unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits. 19 This test, requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate "serious and substantial questions," has found favor in a majority of the circuits-at least at the district court level. 2 " While the use of the "serious and substantial questions" test in private 16 17. Such remedies include consolidation of the hearing on a preliminary injunction with trial on the merits, hold-separate orders and divestiture. See note 159 infra and text accompanying notes 156-61 infra.
18. See SULLIVAN § 215, at 671 ("courts ought to be disposed to enter orders maintaining the status quo whenever the government offers by affidavits a colorable case that the merger transcends legal standards and that adequate ultimate relief would be jeopardized by allowing con- antitrust litigation dates back to the Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 21 case, it has recently assumed increasing importance in antimerger suits initiated by the government. 2 2 Further, the Fourth Circuit has recently adopted a rule prohibiting consideration of private hardship when weighing the equities. 23 Any private losses defendant might suffer as the result of a preliminary injunction issued under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act 24 are deemed irrelevant. The impact of this departure from equity's traditions is still uncertain: while many courts have required strong showings of extreme private hardship to outweigh the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement, 25 no other appellate court has absolutely refused to consider private injury. 26 In any event, confficts have developed between the classic standards for a preliminary injunction and those set out in recent case law, and the federal courts are currently struggling to reconcile these differences.
Compounding the problems in the case law are the various statutory bases of jurisdiction under which the courts may grant preliminary relief. Section 15 of the Clayton Act authorizes the Justice Department to seek injunctions; 27 section 16 authorizes the remedy for private plaintiffs. 2 
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injunctions from the courts; 3 ' eventually the Supreme Court, in FTC v. Dean Foods Co. ,32 found the necessary jurisdiction for the appellate courts under the All Writs Act. 33 Slightly different standards control under each of these jurisdictional statutes. 34 The most serious problem of jurisdiction, however, involves an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, adding section 13(b), 5 which authorizes the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions in the district courts to restrain violations of any law that it enforces. 36 Distinctions between the language of Clayton Act section 15 and that of Federal Trade Commission Act section 13(b) apparently make section 13(b) a more favorable jurisdictional ground for the government. 37 There has been some doubt whether traditional equity standards apply at all under that amendment. 38 These doubts and differences create further conflict among the courts and lead to anomalous results in strikingly similar government 
II. THE NEW STATUTE'S IMPACT ON CURRENT LAW
The notification statute is intended to change only the procedural aspects of antitrust litigation; it is not designed to alter substantive standards, nor to set up any hard and fast rules governing the propriety of injunctive relief.' Thus, the statute does not address directly the substantive problems the courts are now facing. The premerger legislation will, however, have some substantive impact on the government's ability to obtain a preliminary injunction in a particular case. On the merits, the enforcement agencies' access to all relevant information weeks prior to the merger will clearly aid in preparation for the showing of a likelihood of success. 4 The statute's legislative history, with its emphasis on the inadequacy of divestiture to protect the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement, 42 may influence the courts to favor the government's case on the equities. 4 continue their current trend toward liberalization of equity's standards. In light of the legislative history, however, the courts must avoid any radical departure from equity's traditions. The Senate did consider including a provision for automatic relief in the legislation; the bill as originally proposed would have given the enforcement agencies a preliminary injunction solely on certification to the district court that the public interest required such reliefpendente lite. 46 Heavy opposition to this provision came from almost every quarter. Both the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division rejected the proposal in Senate hearings, advising that such discretionary power would be unnecessarily broad. 47 Assistant Attorney General Kauper's remarks were representative of the agencies' attitude: "I suppose, like many bureaucrats, it is nice to have power, but I am also a little suspicious of it, and I think that perhaps that [automatic-stay provision] goes somewhat too far. ' 48 The business community vigorously opposed the automatic injunction, with one business representative attacking the legislation as a denial of due process. 49 Even witnesses who supported the provision expressed concern about possible chilling effects on lawful merger activity. 5 0 If anything emerges clearly from the Senate hearings on its Title V legislation, 5 1 it is the almost uniform criticism of the attempt to deprive the courts of their discretion on merger injunctions. Congressional debate, showing further hostility to such legislation, indicates that the proposal was doomed from the outset. Two considerations in addition to fear of bureaucratic overreachmng support the legislature's decision to omit any automatic-stay provision from the statute. The first is the value of tradition in federal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue with eloquence:
We are dealing here with the requirements of equity practice with a background of several hundred years of history .... Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. as between competing private claims." Tradition is basic to the concept of equity and prevents conflict or confusion among the lower courts. The second consideration, emphasized throughout hearings on the notification statute, is the necessity for iquidity in the capital assets market. 4 To delay a merger is often to kill the merger, and witnesses expressed doubt that entrepreneurial activity could coexist with that degree of governmental control implicit in the automatic stay." The legislature foresaw that such an amendment to the antitrust laws could in fact harm competition by preventing mergers that would be in the public interest. 6 Congress was unwilling to give the FTC and the Justice Department the power to forestall any merger they thought undesirable; the legislature left the decision to the courts of equity in their traditional discretion.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN APPROACHES
In the legislative history of the notification statute, Congress expressed great concern for the broad policy issues involved in preliminary relief against challenged mergers but directed little if any attention to recent developments in the federal courts. In the hearings and debates, Congress ignored both the Second Circuit's balancing approach 57 and the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consider private injury in section 13(b) actions. 5 These developments, however, are of great significance in government antimerger suits, and it is therefore necessary to examine the origin of these tests and their impact on federal equityparticularly in light of the concerns expressed before the legislature in formulating the Clayton Act amendments.
A. The Probability of Success.-The Second Circuit's Substantial
Questions Test.
Traditionally, the two requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction have been applied sequentially; that is, the courts have first required proof of a reasonable probability of success at plenary hearings and have then proceeded to weigh the equities. 9 approach, however, represents an exception to this rule: the equities are weighed first, and where they balance decidedly in favor of the moving party, the injunction will issue merely on a showing of serious and substantial questions on the merits. 60 In other words, a strong showing on the equities may offset a weak showing on the merits. The impact of the balancing approach on federal equity practice has been substantial-the exception may soon engulf the rule in antitrust cases. 6 1 Despite broad acceptance of the balancing approach, the test, as it is currently applied, is subject to three major criticisms. First, the modem version of the approach is arguably a bastardization of equity's traditional role in protecting and reconciling competing claims.
62 Second, to the extent that the modem rule represents a departure from tradition, it has led to confusion among the courts and to attempts to retreat from its more liberal tests. 63 Third, the true function of the approach in antitrust cases may be primarily to satisfy the courts' desire to postpone consideration of complex substantive issues until full hearing, 64 a goal which is particularly inappropriate where issuance of the injunction will probably mean the abandonment of merger plans. A brief history and analysis of the case law serves to illustrate these weaknesses.
In order to measure the extent to which modem law has departed from traditional equity practice, it is necessary to look back to the turn of the century. The balancing approach originated in and was developed primarily by the Second Circuit, where its application in antimerger suits began with Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 6 merits. The court cited a long line of cases, both American and English, 6 6 in support of a rather narrow exception to the usual requirement of a showing of probable success on the merits. Where the moving party would suffer "immediate, certain and great" ' 67 injury if the court denied the injunction and where harm to the defendant would be "inconsiderable" 6 if the court granted it, a preliminary injunction would issue on a showing of only substantial questions on the merits. 69 Only an "enormous preponderance of inconvenience" 7 " to plaintiff would warrant the exception. The court set out its rationale: "The balance of convenience or hardship . . . is a factor of controlling importance in cases of substantial doubt existing at the time of granting or refusing a preliminary injunction."'" The narrow exception set out here seems firmly within equity's traditions and is based on a strong and well-reasoned line of precedent.
The major departure from this statement of the rule appeared in Hamilton Watch Co. v . Benrus Watch Co.,72 involving a Clayton Act challenge brought by the target of an unfriendly takeover. In affirming the district court's preliminary injunction, Judge Frank also placed particular emphasis on the balance of hardship:
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain... ; if the other elements are present (ie., the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.
73
Frank's language--"tips decidedly toward plaintiff"-is a markedly liberal version of the standard set out in Northern Securities. The parenthetical language of Hamilton Watch may be merely a casual restatement of precedent; the court did not ultimately decide the case on the issue of probability of success. The federal courts, nonetheless, have adopted the Hamilton Watch wording, and the narrow exception to the probability of success requirement has consequently become signifi- Taken literally, the requirements for issuance of a preliminary writ are very meager. We are reluctant to believe the Government would institute proceedings that did not present at least a "fair ground for litigation" and "deliberate investigation" by the Court, because issues are "serious, substantial and doubtful." Few Clayton Act cases are simple. Seldom is the Court without doubt in its decision even though it does not say so. The Hamilton Watch case does not hold that the quantum of proof indicated shall apply in all cases-"it will ordinarily be enough." 78 The Hamilton Watch rule, while supported by precedent, clearly went beyond the traditional exception, and the court in Brown Shoe was unwilling to accept the liberal standard.
More recently, the rule of Hamilton Watch has become firmly entrenched in the Second Circuit. The rule reached its maturity in [A] preliminary injunction should issue only upon a clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipg decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. 8 -After Sonesta, the language of Hamilton Watch clearly controls in the Second Circuit; the objection that the liberal wording-Frank's 'casual restatement'-distorts the traditional rule is no longer of much force. may represent a circuitous return to the reasonable probability standard; the government must show a likelihood of success whenever public injury is not amenable to direct proof-and it rarely is. Judge Ward went on to hold that even after a showing by plaintiff of a probability of success, the court must still weigh the equities, requiring in addition that the Justice Department show reasonable probability of harm to the public prior to full trial. 6 Again, the court refused to presume harm from the statute. Ward's opinion clearly represents a cautious approach to the preliminary injunction, an attempt to retreat from the liberal Sonesta rule. The doubt and confusion caused by the Sonesta line is even more apparent in the Third Circuit. A strong line of cases following United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 7 has established that the reasonable probability test prevails in that circuit, 8 8 but district court cases have subjected this standard to substantial erosion. In fact, the history of the controlling Ingersoll-Rand decision illustrates the conflict between appellate and district court opinion. The court of appeals, in affirming the district court's holding, clearly used the reasonable probability standard without mentioning that the lower court in that case had applied the substantial questions test. 8 9 A district court case decided two years later preferred the substantial questions standard and sustained the Justice Department's attack on a merger. 90 A recent private case from the Third Circuit frankly admits that the court turned to the substantial questions test because it provides a method of postponing difficult substantive decisions until full hearing. In Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 91 the court acknowledged that the reasonable probability test prevails in the Third Circuit, but reasoned that "should the Circuit have occasion to rule on the matter in the context of a case such as the one before us, it would embrace the less stringent criterion. 98. See HousE REPORT 7-8 ("Focused as it is on probabilities, this standard for injunctive relief is little different from the steep one forced by [sic] the government at a trial on the merits . . ."); Senate Hearings, pt. I, at 503 (statement of Professor Joseph F. Brodley) ("the Government has been put to the same standard of proof on the motion for preliminary injunction which it must face at the ultimate trial"); id., pt. II, at 1002 (letter from Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Senator Hart) ("In practice, it has frequently been necessary to convince the trial court of the ultimate merits of the case").
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The district courts are therefore caught in a dilemma when choosing between the sequential and balancing approaches: the reasonable probability test is too complex and awkward to be practical at a preliminary hearing; the substantial questions test is too cursory and superficial to be appropriate where the decision may have the effect of final relief. It is hardly surprising that courts faced with this dilemma have adopted an intuitive approach to the problem, choosing between the tests as necessary to preserve the status quo or the possibility of an adequate remedy after final decision.°0 What may be surprising is that the pattern currently emerging is on6 of broad acceptance of the balancing approach in private antimerger litigation and adherence to the reasonable probability test in government suits.
The various weaknesses in the balancing approach are primarily the result of this government plaintiff-private plaintiff dichotomy. The Sonesta line developed exclusively in the context of private actions, and it was the application of this approach to government suits that led Cal. 1979 ) (allowing for possibility of using Sonesta in government suit where government shows "decided tipping of the equities").
followed Hamilton, the substantial questions test has yet to be applied in a government suit in any of those jurisdictions. The Fourth Circuit's decisions are particularly apposite here, in view of the fact that a 1977 appellate decision liberalizing the standard for a private plaintiff 1 0 6 came only one month after another appellate decision requiring a strict standard of proof and a showing of probability of success from the FTC. 7 In addition, a Fourth Circuit ruling only six months earlier held that the FTC met its burden of a "substantial likelihood of success."' 0 8 Although no court has specifically addressed this distinction between government and private suits or attempted to explain it, it clearly exists.
Commentary attempting to justify the distinction between government and private cases is not entirely convincing.
1 0 9 The theory is that the government, in contrast to the private plaintiff, is unlikely to abandon its suit after failing to obtain a preliminary injunction. The government's resources are not as limited as those of a private plaintiff, and while the government has the alternative of divestiture, that remedy may be unavailable to the private plaintiff. The denial of a preliminary injunction is more likely to have the effect of final relief in a private action, thus making the more liberal substantial questions test appropriate. 110 This argument seems rather weak, however, because the government's resources are actually quite limited.' Furthermore, if divestiture is an inadequate remedy, its availability in government suits should make little difference in terms of the applicable test.
There is a more compelling reason for rejection of Sonesta in government suits. Many of the difficulties with the balancing approach may be traced to the origin and development of the Sonesta line of cases; that standard evolved solely in private antitrust actions where the irreparable injury and balance of hardship requirements are of great importance, and it is far less appropriate in government suits where presumptions of injury often control. The substantial questions test is now triggered by a "decided imbalance" of the equities, but the Sonesta approach gives courts little guidance as to the relative weights of the required showings even in private suits. The point at which the equities "tip decidedly" is necessarily less clear in government suits where a somewhat nebulous public injury must be balanced against concrete and measurable private hardship.
1 2 Because damage to the public interest is not amenable to direct proof, courts often presume such injury from the existence of a statute, particularly a statute which specifically authorizes a preliminary injunction." 3 The utility of Sonesta is extremely doubtful in government cases: it is all but impossible to determine when the balance tips decidedly in favor of a public injury which is merely presumed as opposed to a private harm which is clearly identifiable.
Thus, modem trends to reduce the required showing on the merits are coming into conflict with developments on the requisite showing on the equities. In order to understand this conflict more fully, it is necessary to examine the recent developments on the equities, particularly the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consider any private injury in weighing the equities.
B. The Balance of the Equities. The Fourth Circuit Excludes
Consideration of the Respondent~' Injury.
The Fourth Circuit has initiated what is obviously the most liberal development in the required showing on the equities. The holding in FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc. 14 marks a radical departure from the orthodox rules of equity; the court held that in section 13(b) proceedings private injuries that respondents might suffer as a result of the injunction did not even merit consideration." 5 Judge Winter, sitting as the single judge, refused to weigh a number of contingencies, among them the possibility of a lawsuit by a creditor or by stockholders, the necessity of amending the SEC registration statement, a possible decline in the value of Foodtown's stock and the ultimate abandonment of the merger. Winter did consider possible public benefits flowing from the acquisition, but characterized them as too speculative to outweigh the public injury involved in an anticompetitive merger. 1 18 In sum, Food Town apparently established an almost irrebutable presumption in favor of the government on the equities. The language of section 13(b) is open to Winter's interpretation. The statute gives the district courts power to issue a preliminary injunction where, "weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of success, such action would be in the public interest." 11 9 Judge Winter read the statute as if the requirement of balancing the equities was centered on the public interest standard. Thus, the emphasis of section 13(b)'s language-ambiguous as it may be-led Winter to infer that Congress was referring only to "public equities." Under this interpretation, a corporation may introduce evidence of public benefit deriving from a merger 120 but cannot rely on the injunction's direct impact on the firms involved.
The statute's language seems inadequate to justify Winter's sharp break with longstanding principles of equity, and the Food Town rule is therefore subject to serious criticism. The holding, however, is based largely on the legislative history of section 13(b). Winter cited the House Committee Report to demonstrate the intent "to maintain the statutory or 'public interest' standard which is now applicable and not to impose the traditional 'equity' standard." ' The report went on to comment that the traditional tests are not "appropriate for the implementation of a Federal statute where the standards of the public inter- Many courts, however, have adopted a line of reasoning similar to that in Food Town. Some courts, while avoiding an absolute refusal to consider private harm, have held that the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement is entitled to great weight and that private hardship must be extreme before the balance can be tipped in respondent's favor. In United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' the district court held that the defendants' possible injuries were "entitled to serious consideration" but concluded that "they cannot outweigh the public interest in preventing this merger from taking effect pending trial .... The public interest with which Congress was concerned in enacting Section 7 is paramount."' 3 4 A Third Circuit district court has held that "the public interest in preserving a free-competitive [sic] economy cannot be outweighed by any private interest."' ' 35 Courts seem almost hostile at times to corporate interests: "The public interest in preventing a violation of Sec. 7 outweighs considerations of losses to speculating or investing stockholders . . 136 In general, these courts have given little weight to corporate injury; the public interest will prevail except in extraordinary circumstances.
Id. at 1346 (emphasis in original
Other courts have taken a less dogmatic approach and have attempted to reach a compromise between the important public interest in preventing antitrust violations and the serious private harm often caused by a preliminary injunction. The district court in United States v. Pennzoil Co. '17 attempted to find a compromise on the equities standard: "[The showing of defendants' injury] must be so proportionately persuasive as to submerge the principle that '[t]he status of public interest and not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for relief.' "s138 More frequently, the courts have used a compromise remedy, allowing the merger to go through but issuing a holdseparate order to keep the assets and securities of the acquired firm intact. 1 
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of the acquiring firm in determining the balance of hardships. 1 4 ' Courts in the Second and Eighth Circuits have also used the compromise remedy to avoid inequity.
14 2 The prevailing atmosphere in these courts is a sort of "strict scrutiny" in antitrust cases, with a heightened sensitivity to the strong public interest.
Many of the courts' problems on the equities arise in attempting to assess the extent of the public injury involved in any given case. It is all but impossible to place a definite value on intangible injury to local or national competition.' 43 There are two approaches to this problem: a court may emphasize the public interest in preventing violations of antitrust laws, relying generally on the antitrust statutes as expressions of public policy;'" alternatively, a court may stress foreseeable and particular components of injury to consumers, competitors or, in the case of hostile tender offers, the acquired entities.' 45 The results of these two approaches are often disparate: emphasis on the public's interest in statutory enforcement usually precludes a balance in favor of the merger, 146 while more detailed analysis of public and private injury gives defendants an opportunity to show tangible harm and the government evidentiary problems. 47 Food Town and similar cases illustrate that the first approach is increasingly becoming the rule; there is a very strong presumption that the equities weigh in the government's favor.
The presumptions are buttressed by the courts' abandonment of another traditional rule, that a preliminary injunction will not issue where the result is to give petitioner the effect of final relief.
1 48 Normally, equity seeks to maintain the status quo with a preliminary injunction. In the context of mergers and acquisitions, however, preserving the status quo is often impossible, as the deal, if enjoined, cannot be held together pending final judgment, and the merger, if allowed, will irrevocably alter the competitive situation.
14 9 One com-mentator has argued that the courts appear to be sensitive to this problem and are unwilling to issue an injunction where its effect would be to kill the merger."' 0 One has only to look to cases such as Food Town and Lancaster, however, to realize that courts no longer find persuasive respondents' fears that the injunction will have the effect of final relief. In rejecting this traditional rule of equity, the courts are often influenced by the inadequacy of divestiture after litigation as a remedy.
In the early 1960s, divestiture may have been considered the usual remedy in merger cases; but as the courts became aware of Congress' continuing dissatisfaction with the results of divestiture, they turned to the preliminary injunction as a more effective tool for antitrust enforcement. case has held that rescission may be used to remedy an anticompetitive merger.' 58 The availability of rescission, which would eliminate some of the problems of divestiture, 5 9 might encourage the use of hold-separate orders with an eye toward rescission rather than divestiture. A more attractive approach would be the consolidation of hearings on the preliminary injunction with full trial, as authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 160 In cases where trial can be expedited, 61 this approach avoids not only the hardships worked by prolonged preliminary relief but also the problems of divestiture. The consolidation of hearings, as well as the use of rescission, will not be practical or appropriate in every case, but the availability of relief less drastic than the preliminary injunction provides some counterweight to modem presumptions that the equities are in the government's favor. Despite recent use of alternatives to divestiture, presumptions in the government's favor are still quite strong, and these presumptions, coupled with limitations on defendants' showing on the equities, make Sonesta's balancing test extremely difficult to apply in government suits. Because the government's case usually relies heavily on the strength of the public interest in effective enforcement, 62 it is all but impossible to determine when the substantial questions standard should be triggered. An even more forceful argument against the use of Sonesta in government suits is that public injury can be presumed only when the government has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits. The presumption of harm is derived from the threatened violation of the Clayton Act, but if the government fails to show a likelihood of success, there is no real reason to suspect that the law will be broken or to presume injury to competition. Thus, the balancing approach is at odds with modem treatment of the equities: when the government relies on the serious and substantial questions test, the courts should also require a showing of a serious threat of public injury-a requirement which Congress and the courts have eliminated.
The federal courts have not dealt with this issue explicitly, but at least one holding, the Culbro decision by Judge Ward, appears to have (not fundamentally unfair to force government to have its case ready within 133 days of filing complaint where government waited four and a half months after announcement of merger to file complaint and had familiarity with industry from previous litigation). 162 . See cases cited in note 15 supra.
[Vol. 1979:249 intuitively sensed the problem. 16 3 In applying the substantial questions test, Ward eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm and required a showing of probability of actual public injury.1 64 Thus, the Culbro case attempted to square the Sonesta test with modem treatment of the equities in government cases. The attempt may not have been conceptually satisfying, especially when Congress had eliminated the irreparable harm requirement,
1 65 yet such a move was necessary to reconcile incompatible developments in the law. hearings will weigh against use of the drastic preliminary injunction. These last conclusions, however, may be premature: the Lancaster decision did combine the substantial questions test with a refusal to consider any private harm. 1 6 9 Under this approach, the traditional standards of equity are nothing more than traditions.
C. Summary. Standards for a Preliminary

IV. IMPACT OF THE NEW REPORT-AND-WAIT RULES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S SHOWING ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS
In light of the complexity of antitrust litigation, the FTC has issued a very comprehensive report form designed to obtain any and all information that may be useful in seeking preliminary relief.1 70 The FTC has required that the reporting firm disclose the extent of its holdings after the planned acquisition; the structure of its domestic corporate family; its products, sales and revenues; and the securities it has issued or holds. Further, the reporting form demands copies of all surveys, analyses or similar studies conducted in preparation for the acquisition.' 7 ' While this last requirement may be difficult to enforce, particularly if the studies emphasize antitrust aspects of the acquisition, 72 it does serve as an accurate indicator of the depth of the FTC's investigation under the new rules. Finally, the reporting statute merely requires substantial compliance, 73 but the FTC's reporting rules are satisfied only by total compliance, as the Commission has held the requirements to the minimum necessary for effective enforcement. [Vol. 1979:249
The meaning of total compliance is uncertain; the FTC requests information which the reporting firm may or may not have, particularly as to the extent of overlap in sales or operations of acquiring and acquired firms. Supplemented by the FTC's powers to delay or extend the waiting period and to request additional information, 7 5 however, the report form should be able to reach all relevant information. The data required under the regulations is exactly that which courts have considered important in determining the government's likelihood of success on the merits. The language of the Clayton Act-"where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" 76 --controls in the court's evaluation of the probability of success. Thus, courts look first to the relevant product lines, the relevant geographic market, and the firms' quantity of sales and market share of that product.
177 All this information will be readily available to the enforcement agencies through the new reporting rules and market census data from government sources or from private industrial associations. 17 Courts then proceed to consider these findings in light of other evidence: first, whether the merger is primarily vertical, horizontal or conglomerate in nature; second, the firms' combined share of market resources and sales; third, the degree of concentration of production in the industry; fourth, any trend toward concentration in the industry; fifth, difficulty of entry into the industry; sixth, elimination of a substantial competitor; and finally, possible development of reciprocal relationships due to increase in market power. 79 A brief analysis of the new reporting form shows that it has been designed to deal with these issues.
The first item on the report form requires no more than identification of the reporting firm and responses to a series of questions in a checklist format; items two and three, however, are far more extensive, requesting a detailed description of the acquisition. Basically, these 175. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1976). 
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items are designed to elicit information concerning the nature and extent of the control the acquiring firm will have after the acquisition. The antitrust agencies should have little difficulty with questions of control in the courts. Only acquisitions of more than fifteen percent of the assets or outstanding stock or acquisitions valued at more than $15 million are subject to the reporting requirements. The courts will accept this level of ownership as adequate to bring the Clayton Act into play. 8 The only problem here lies in distinguishing between acquisitions made to influence the management policies of the acquired firm and those made solely for investment purposes or in the normal course of business. Because the latter types of acquisitions are specifically exempted from the reporting requirements, 18 there may be some disagreement concerning the intent of the acquiring party. Such issues, however, rarely reach the litigation stage.' 8 2
Items four and six of the report form examine the fiscal performance, the corporate structure and the securities base of the acquiring firm. Item four requires the reporting firm to submit copies of SEC registration documents, 1 8 3 annual reports, audits, surveys and studies prepared in planning the merger. This information, particularly the firm's internal memoranda, will aid the enforcement agencies in developing cases involving the potential entrant or toehold acquisition theories.' 84 This information may also be used to counter the failingcompany defense. 184. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977). Arco attempted to merge with a giant in the copper industry, the Anaconda Company. The two firms were not competitors. Under the potential entrant theory, however, the FTC could establish an antitrust violation by showing that "butfor the merger, Arco could reasonably be expected ... to become an entrant into these markets and areas of competition." Id. at 292. As Anaconda was a leader in copper markets, the FTC also argued that in order to preserve competition Arco should enter the industry with a toehold acquisition; that is, "market entry by acquisition of a smaller firm already present in the market." Id. at 293 n.4. The court was not receptive to either theory at the preliminary stage of the litigation, requiring "strict proof of any anticompetitive effect." Id. at 295.
185. In order to set up the "failing company" defense to a Clayton § 7 charge, the defendant must show that the resources of the acquired firm were "so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitiation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure." International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930) . The defendant must also show that the acquiring company is entities within its corporate "family," all major shareholders, and all holdings from issuers outside the parent and its subsidiaries. These requirements will operate to bring out any possible anticompetitive effects that may result when different branches of a large firm, or various holdings in a large corporate or personal portfolio, begin to overlap in production.
Courts have been most concerned with the information provided in items five, seven, eight and nine. Under item five, the reporting firm must disclose dollar revenues from each manufacturing industry in which it participates, from each product that it manufactures, from each product class and from each non-manufacturing industry. This information will then be correlated with manufacturing census data to determine the firm's market share in relevant lines of commerce-the single most important factor in antimerger litigation. 186 Item seven requests that the reporting firm list all states where it does business in any industry in which both the acquiring and acquired persons participate.
This data will assist the Commission and the Antitrust Division in establishing the relevant geographic markets for purposes of analyzing The most serious problem with the current reporting system is the use of the standard industrial classification codes1 88 to define manufacthe "only available purchaser." Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969) . See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) . In General Dynamics the depletion of the reserves of the acquired coal-mining firm was held inadequate to raise the "failing company" defense but was sufficient to defeat the government's showing of a substantial lessening of competition in long-term contracts. Id. at 508. The acquired firm, having committed substantially all of its reserves on prior contracts, was no longer an effective competitor for future contracts. DUKE LAW JOUAAL turing and non-manufacturing industries, products and product classes.
The identification codes were not designed to set out lines of commerce for antitrust purposes, and their accuracy in determining whether industries or products are competitive is doubtful. There is also a problem of characterization under the codes, as it may be possible to mask anticompetitive effects by identifying similar, competitive products with different code numbers. 18 9 The problem is not insoluble: enforcement agencies may eventually find it necessary to have products identified with technical language that is standard in the trade.
The new reporting requirements will definitely aid the government in its showing of a likelihood of success. Firms planning an acquisition or merger will no longer have any reason to delay in replying to civil investigative demands; in fact, firms will have every reason to satisfy the enforcement agencies in order to trigger the start of the statutory waiting period. 90 The Commission and the Justice Department will have the option to request additional information during the waiting period,1 9 1 but the agencies will have most of the necessary material at the beginning of the thirty-day period. Problems with the current reporting form may be resolved either by requests for additional information in order to clarify the initial report or by alterations in the reporting form to require more specific identification of industries and products.1 9 2 Consequently, the government will have a full and fair 189. The codes, designed for census purposes, allow identification of products by their composition (metals, plastics, glass, etc.) and by their end use (parts for passenger cars, dinnerware, household appliances, etc.). Thus, products having many components or multiple uses are difficult to classify. For example, spark plugs could be placed in a number of categories: 3694411 (automobile spark plugs); 3694431 (other type spark plugs); 3519915 (parts and accessories for internal combustion engines); 3714198 (parts for passenger cars); 35249311 (parts for lawnmowers); etc. While the Census Bureau could expect little dishonesty in the use of these codes, the FTC and the Justice Department may not be so fortunate, as reporting firms may wish to deemphasize anticompetitive impact. Also, the codes ignore producr interchangeability. Merging firms may be manufacturing products with vastly different end uses, but the cost of switching over to product lines having the same end use may be minimal. Again, anticompetitive impact would not be revealed by the standard industrial classification codes. Given the current state of the law governing the preliminary injunction-its delicate balance between various standards on the required showing of likelihood of success-the question inevitably arises whether the reporting requirements will influence courts in either direction. It seems clear that any influence should be toward the reasonable probability standard. The government will now have access to all necessary data; it has a minimum of thirty days to prepare a showing of reasonable probability that the acquisition may tend to lessen competition.'
9 4 The reporting rules should have no effect on private antitrust suits, but the liberal showing of the Sonesta test seems more readily applicable to private plaintiffs in any case. The Sonesta test has led to hesitation or confusion when applied in government suits where presumptions of harm control. Furthermore, the substantial questions test has proved particularly attractive when the issues are too complex to be handled in depth in a preliminary proceeding. The notification requirements, however, should enable the government to show a reasonable probability of success despite complicated issues and despite the preliminary nature of the proceeding. If the government cannot make a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, it is doubtful that an injunction should issue.
The legislative history of the Antitrust Improvements Act states that the reporting requirements were not intended to change the substantive rules governing preliminary injunctions.' 95 In view of the unstable state of the law, however, no such change is necessary. A court may simply choose to follow one line of cases-that requiring a reasonable probability of success-rather than another line applying Sonesta's dual standard. In fact, the legislative history assumes that the reasonable probability standard prevails in all circuits.
196 Although (1976) (requiring FTC to report to Congress and to include recommendations for revision of section).
193. See note 41 supra. See Senate Hearings, pt. III, at 72 (statement of Eleanor Fox) ("Having this information, the Government will be well situated to get preliminary relief where it is reasonably likely to prevail. When the Government's case is so thin that it is not likely to prevail, we [the ABA's Antitrust Section] believe merging companies should have the right to consummate the transactions").
194. HousE REPORT 7 ("Thus, both Congress and the courts have repeatedly emphasized that section 7 is an 'incipiency' statute: It is intended to halt monopolies and restraints of trade in their initial stages, before they ripen into full-scale Sherman Act violations.... mhe government carries the burden of proof in premerger injunction proceedings, and must demonstrate a 'reasonable probability that it will prevail on the merits of its Clayton Act challenge'" (footnote omitted)). the House Report characterizes the standard as steep because the test is frequently the same as that required for final relief, 19 7 Congress chose not to alter the test-as was certainly within its power-but to seek a less drastic solution. Whether the statute will have any impact on the current liberal trend is yet to be determined, but any reaction by the courts should be in the direction of retreat rather than further liberalization.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW REPORT-AND-WAIT RULES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S SHOWING ON THE EQUITIES
Courts weighing the equities often turn to expressions of public policy contained in statutes or legislative history in order to resolve difficulties in measuring the public interest; furthermore, the courts taking this approach have usually found the public interest to be paramount. ' A great deal of legislative history lies behind the new statute, 19 9 and it is quite likely that courts will look to congressional statements on the purpose and intent of the Act. Again, no change in substantive law is necessary. A court need only emphasize legislative concern with the agencies' failures to prevent anticompetitive mergers and with the inadequacy of divestiture in order to tip the equities decidedly in the government's favor. 2°A superficial examination of the legislative history may well convince a court that the public interest is of such magnitude as to outweigh any private harm. Antitrust laws have long been held to protect an especially important public interest; the prevailing attitude is that "democracy can be preserved only by dispersing and decentralizing economic and financial power." ' 20 ' Congress has been particularly solicitous-if not always perfectly rational-in guarding against the adverse effects of anticompetitive behavior. 2 " 2 In addition, Congress has expressed dissatisfaction with the enforcement agencies' record in preventing consummation of questionable mergers: "[The weight of the burden of proof [in antimerger cases], together with the present lack of any premerger notification and waiting requirements, has meant that many large and illegal mergers have been successfully consummated in recent years, before the government had any realistic chance to challenge them. '2°3 After consummation of the merger, divestiture has proved inadequate to restore the competitive environment; 20 4 the public interest can only be protected by more effective preliminary relief.
Thomas Kauper, 2°5 in enumerating the benefits of the new reportand-wait rules, pointed out that preliminary relief has been far more effective than divestiture. 20 6 Joseph Brodley 2°7 elaborated on this issue: "The only significant exception to this bleak remedial picture occurs in those relatively few cases in which the government has been able to obtain advance injunctive relief staying the merger pending the resolution of the cases." 2 8 The House Report accepted this analysis, citing United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 209 and United States v. Papercraft Corp. 2 10 as examples of divestiture's failure to protect the public interest and United States v. Amax, Inc.,21 where the firms voluntarily delayed the merger pending final decision, as a model of success. 2 A court considering the history of the legislation might be influenced to grant a preliminary injunction on the ground that the public will suffer serious injury in the interim prior to final decision. Further, once the equities tip decisively in favor of the government, the lesser standard of Sonesta is applicable. Thus, the government's burden is lightened on both points. The courts, reluctant to gamble that a divestible entity will be in existence after final disposition, may move further wards of their development efforts. Unsuccessful competitors can limit their losses. Diversified companies can release inefficient or unsuitable segments of their enterprises. New groups can assume leadership roles of public companies (or at least keep current management on its toes) by the tender offer mechanism, thus assuring innovation and change. 2 19 Corporate representatives emphasized the point that "the great majority of merger-type transactions are economically healthy" 2 2 and that "government agencies only attack mergers in a small number of cases." 221 While the corporate testimony is clearly in the nature of a lobbying effort, the risk of discouraging lawful mergers cannot be discounted; the courts must avoid too liberal an approach in issuing preliminary injunctions against mergers.
In weighing the equities, the courts must consider not only private harm, but also two countervailing components of the public interest. The courts must guard against too heavy a concentration of market power. As a House task force concluded: "Increasing sectors of our economy have become alarmingly vulnerable to monopoly and effective oligopoly. . . .We have witnessed the systematic development of planned obsolescence in a variety of products and a growing tendency to reduce output rather than prices. ' 222 Congress has demanded that courts prevent the effective repeal of the "fundamental laws of the competitive marketplace."" 3 On the other hand, courts must weigh the public interest in a free market for capital assets, where entry and exit from industries are relatively free from government regimentation. If There is a serious question whether free enterprise can survive this kind of government dictation of the size, shape, structure, and mode of operation of the economy. Pricing policies, marketing procedures, and capital arrangements and rearrangements are the essence of our system. When these matters are controlled by the decisions of administrative agencies. . ., rather than by men staking their fortunes on their ability to serve consumers, the result is the corporative state. Antitrust principles are now being pursued to the bitter end. Had they been pushed so far at the start, the economy would have been frozen in a relatively primitive cast.. . and beyond much doubt, nowhere near the technological progress, the wages, or the standard of living that now prevails. Petro, The Growing Threat of Antitrust, FORTUNE, Nov. 1962, at 128. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962) ("Congress recognized the stimulation to competition that might flow from particular mergers ..... Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition." (emphasis in original)). Adam Smith's "invisible hand" is to guide the American marketplace, 2 24 it cannot be manacled by protracted delay and unnecessary interference from the government agencies.
The legislative history of the report-and-wait statute illustrates the conflict between these two components of public interest. Congress carefully balanced these countervailing considerations and concluded that the courts should be allowed to retain broad discretion in issuing preliminary injunctions. Courts weighing the equities should be as careful as Congress was in drafting the legisation. The federal courts should be aware of the need for mergers and acquisitions to move freely and quickly; they should be sensitive to the likelihood that preliminary relief will create an insuperable bar to a proposed merger. Congress rejected the automatic stay and a shift in the burden of proof; the courts should avoid a pro forma approach or a burdensome presumption in the government's favor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal courts should take a cautious approach in issuing preliminary injunctions against mergers under the expedited procedure of the new report-and-wait statute. The Sonesta approach may be useful in private litigation, but its appearance in government suits has led to confusion regarding the standards to be applied in granting or refusing injunctive relief. Coitemporary developments on the equities make Sonesta inappropriate in government suits. The circuit courts may retreat to the reasonable probability standard, secure in the knowledge that the government will have early access to all information necessary to show a likelihood of.success. The Fourth Circuit's refusal to weigh private injury under section 13(b) should be reexamined in light of the legislative history of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, since The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it. Id. The wisdom in his metaphor, however, endures:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.... [File intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, ledby an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress did express concern for private hardships. Courts which have taken a similar approach should be more hesitant to conclude that the public interest always outweighs private harm; Congress did not intend that the Commission and the Antitrust Division fashion a model economy based on the agencies' conception of the public interest. Congress apparently concluded that preliminary injunctive relief is still a drastic remedy, and the courts should follow the policy ultimately adopted by the legislature after years of careful consideration and compromise: a conservative approach to the use of the preliminary injunction in antitrust cases.
